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Article 5

Book Reviews
Literary Landscape: Turner and Constable by Ronald Paulson. New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1982. Pp. xii + plates. + 274. $18.95.
This book provides an intellectually systematic interpretation of Turner
and Constable which should encourage profitable dispute about how best to
evaluate their accomplishments. Paulson claims Reynolds and Hogarth to be
founders of "English landscape painting as a literary-conceptual form" (p.
21), and though he says nothing about Reynolds he argues forcefully for
Hogarth's role, above all through his series Times of Day. Paulson makes
brief but unfailingly cogent remarks on several painters, including Gaspar,
Canalletto, Morland, Gainsborough, and Wilson, and on several pertinent
topics, such as the relation of pastoral and georgie. He makes good use of pioneering works by John Barrell and Jay Appleton, developing, for instance,
the latter's illuminating suggestion of geological similarities between Constable's two favored locales, Hampstead Heath and the Stour Valley.
Both Paulson's preliminary survey and his detailed analyses of Turner
and Constable are structured by his Freudian concept of art, defined thus:
the work of art must be taken as the totality of the symptomatic scene
in which desire, meaning, and dream come together.
[My] model is based on the Freudian assumptions that primary process
thinking ... tends to be pictorial rather than verbal and is governed
by the pleasure principle ... Secondary-process thinking ... obeys
the laws of verbal grammar and logic and is governed by a reality
principle. (p. 168)
The equivalent of "dream" in art for Paulson is
the painting as primary process-Turner's original marks on canvas
... before the painting has suffered or benefitted from the secondaryrevision of the artist on the canvas, off the canvas, and in his critics'
interpretations.
The painting is (unlike the dream) concretely present, and yet there is
much that is only recoverable in the dream-work that follows upon,
and helps to create, the image itself.
The last phrase, "the image itself," I take to refer to the painting we see as
distinct from the "original marks on the canvas."
The painting is a case in which a seemingly subordinate supplement
-a revision or a remark in a letter-may introduce considerations
that are implicit or repressed in the image itself ... We can nevertheless get some fix upon the image ... by examining Constable's (or
Turner's) symbolizations, their own verbal interpretations of their
landscape paintings. (p. 169)
Whatever one's doubts about the validity of Paulson's model-I suspect
that literary critics but not art historians will accept his equating of a "revision" of the painting on the canvas with "a remark in a letter"-his clear ar165
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ticulation of his method makes possible an intellectual level of
disagreement too seldom permitted by recent studies of the graphic arts. By
so plainly defining his method of approach, for example, Paulson renders
useful, that is, debatable, rather than merely arbitrary, his strong preference
for Constable as an artist whose triumphs are "more dearly won" than are
Turner's.
Turner, for Paulson, provides "an extreme case of the incompatability of
visual and verbal structure" (p. 63). For instance:
The intersection of different moments in time is an essential meaning
of the Turner historical landscape. But it is often specified in literary
rather than visual ways .... Even when the allusion itself is graphic,
the image conveys its meaning through literary rather than graphic
form. (p. 72)
The key to understanding Turner is the sun. Instead of placing the observer
in a shaded foreground, as does Claude, Turner
confronts his viewer with the sun, giving him total prospect but depriving him of any refuge whatever in the foreground or middle distance ... leaving him naked and without a place to stand.
. (p. 89)
From this excellent reading (making good use of Appleton'S prospect-refuge
paradigm) derives Paulson's less persuasive interpretation of the Turnerian
vortex, which
originates in a pun ... Turner, my name; a maker or an artist; a constructor of vortices in particular, a revolutionary; He who revolves the
earth ... with revolutionary and God we are at the heart of the vortex.

(p.100)
Paulson argues that one can establish in Turner's art "a verbal impetus before as well as after the graphic image has been made," and this second verbalizing is an attempt "to recapture an original meaning, obscured by the
graphic image" (p. 100). In Turner's paintings, therefore, one finds
an attempt to absorb the natural object in the subject, to make it a symbol for his own state of mind; but at the same time he acknowledges
the existence of the gap within a failed language. (p. 101)
Turning to Constable, Paulson distinguishes "between an art that represents revolution ... and an art that is itself, in terms of artistic tradition.
revolutionary," citing Turner and Blake as mere representers and Wordsworth and Constable as true revolutionaries. Odd as this description may be
of Blake and Turner, it breaks Paulson free from many cliches that have
crippled commentaries on Constable. He notes that Constable depicts not
"landscape" but "farming, milling, canal-transport, and various kinds of
labor" (p. 118), and that the "spaciousness" of the "six-footers" entails "focusing in a monumentally simple shape on a single aspect of the landscape
experience" (p. 120). Constable reverses what Jay Appleton has called
prospect-refuge symbolism by "making the foreground and the woods turbulent and threatening, and the distant clearing a peaceful refuge" (p. 125).
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This pattern to Paulson is the essence of the Constable landscape, dark foreground with sun-lit meadow in the middle distance. Finally, making use of
Lacan, Paulson defines the major question about Constable's paintings of
the 1830s as whether or not they show that the acquistion of the symbolic
order of language is in fact a precondition for a mastery of the imaginary,
the visual.
All this is splendidly stimulating criticism, and to Paulson's fine definition of "Constable's ideological revolution" in painting as consisting in a
desire to suppress both "the imitation of landscapes painted by earlier artists" and "the telling of a story, the allegorizing or otherwise tarting up of
the landscape" (p. 108) I have only a small objection. Paulson quotes Constable's analysis of a landscape by Ruisdael portraying an approaching storm
that concludes with the remark that Ruisdael "'has here told a story' of the
weather" (p. 110). On the next page Paulson says that in Constable's remark
"on Ruidael 'telling a story' there is an implicit metaphor of narrative."
How could Constable have been more explicit? I cite this triviality because it
points toward my difficulty with Paulson's subsequent analysis of Constable's lecture on the origin of landscape painting, which concludes that
"Constable cannot get out of his head the idea that pictures and poems are
the same thing" (p. 135). This seems to me untrue. Nor can I accept Paulson's interpretation of Constable's suggestion about the origin of landscape
painting in religious art.

The' cross must be fixed in the ground, there must be a sky, the shades of
night must envelop the garden (the scene of the agony), and a more
awful darkness the Crucifixion; while rocks and trees naturally made a
part of the accompaniments of the sepulchre. Here, then, however
rude and imperfect, we are to look for the origin of landscape. (p. 134)
The opening words, which I have italicized, seem to me quintessential Constable, but Paulson, ignoring the painter's concern with origin, argues that
Constable has simply removed the history from a history painting ...
'landscape' is history painting with the history ... removed. The history is not, as Turner would have it, added in a corner to legitimate
the landscape. The landscape is arranged and activated as if there were
heroic figures contesting within it. (p. 134)
For me, this misreads Constable, and even contradicts Paulson's claim for
Constable's "revolutionary" qualities as impressive because not mere negations. In fact, Constable's observations on the origin of landscape art are
congruent with Wordsworth's views, who certainly didn't regard landscape
as diminished history.
Like many recent literary critics treating painting, Paulson approaches
Romantic art by depending heavily on Burke's concept of sublimity, for
Burke's psychologism and proto-structuralist habit of thinking in terms of
abstract binary oppositions make him attractive to Freudian systematizers
who can't get it out of their heads that poems and paintings are the same
things, symptoms of private psychic pressures. But Romanticism arises in
opposition to Burkean mechanistic systematizing. The development of both
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watercolor painting and the cult of the picturesque at the end of the eighteenth century, for instance, are crucial to the socio-historical context. in
which Romantic art takes shape. To ignore that context-however fuzzy,
contradictory, and inept both theoreticians and practitioners of an emergent
Counter-Enlightenment-is to lose the possibility of accurately defining
Turner's and Constable's unique contributions to the history of English art.
Arguably, moreover, rigorous identification of primary process with the
visual and secondary process with verbal symbolization by oversimplifying
the processes of revision distorts what it aims to display, the internal history
of each work of art. Paulson is cursory on the painters' actual reworkings,
saying little, for a surprising instance, about the relation of Constable's polished "six-footers" to the many different kinds of "sketches" that preceded,
accompanied, and even followed "finished" canvases. Paulson's lack of interest in the specifically painterly history of particular canvases is startling
because his Freudian-Lacanian scheme makes the visual "primary." Perhaps
the paradox arises from Paulson's distaste for "imagination," a word he
scarcely uses except in the form of "imaginary," meaning what needs control by the "symbolic." But for Romantic painting, as for Romantic poetry,
"imagination" is much more than imaginary, being the power of unifying
invention and execution into vital recreation. Imagination accounts for what
might be called the dialogic dimension of Constable's and Turner's arthow it enables a viewer's response to it to change. These Romantic pictures
ordinarily do not look the same from different distances, and they are constructed so that a viewer's response to them develops over a period of time.
Herein, I believe, lies the significant innovation of these Romantic artists,
not, as Paulson would have it, in their shifting relations between verbal and
visual components. Yet even if I am correct on this point, like all other students of Romantic art I am indebted to Paulson for radically raising the level
of critical discussion about England's greatest landscape artists. No scholar
can do more than that.
Columbia University

Karl Kroeber
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Milton and the Science of the Saints by Georgia B. Christopher. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp xii + 264. $22.50.

Georgia B. Christopher's Milton and the Science of the Saints departs from
much the same point as John Knott's The Sword of the Spirit-that is from the
Reformers' intense feeling for the power of "the Word" in all its senses.
Knott traced out the history of the Puritans' changing response to this "literary theology," as Christopher calls it. Christopher shows the ways in which
Milton kept the truth of Luther and Calvin so pure of old, despite the intervening century and a half of development. That is, she moves back and
forth between Luther and Calvin on the one hand, and Milton on the other.
Like Knott's book, Christopher's shows, to this biased reader, that the most
revealing approach to Milton is still through reformed theology and religious writing.
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The Reformation would probably have been impossible without the
printing press. Christopher reminds us again how vivid particularly Luther's experiences with Scripture had been for him; similarly, he handled
the relationships between Old and New Testament history by talking about
a "Church of the Word" which had existed since creation. Like Luther, Calvin also thought that the believer must have such an intense experience
with "the Word." A nice reading of the youthful Milton's "Nativity Ode"
shows how the emphasis upon song there manifests the Protestant "sacrament" of "hearing the word." While the Church of England, in all its doctrinal diversity and inner contentiousness, held tha~ lithe Church" was
defined by the administration of sacraments and preaching of the word, for
exponents of this particular feeling for lithe Word," the second component
edged out the first, almost completely, in importance.
Christopher uses this sense of lithe Word" to examine Comus, Paradise Lost,
Paradise Regain'd, and Samson Agonistes. The first she calls a "masque a eli",,'
finding the doctrinal content latent, available to the initiate yet IImasqued"
by the pagan and semi-classical trappings. Christopher tellingly notes that
A.S.P. Woodhouse, who expounded the fissured Puritan view of the mutually exclusive realms of nature and grace, yet read Comus as a blending or
harmonization of those realms. "Much depends upon one's starting point
when approaching the masque" (32), and Christopher starts with the reformer's opposition between "love" and "faith" to show that a latent, reformed reading of the masque is possible.
Christopher has many fine things to say about Paradise Lost. Among these
are her feeling that Satan is deranged, unable to understand God's words.
God speaks no human or reasonable language (while Satan uses ureason"
only); he reveals his promise, the Son, progressively through the poem as a
Christus Victor. IIProgressive may be a misleading term, however, for Christopher shrewdly notes that for the Puritans, lithe notion that history sweeps
qualitatively on from shadowy types toward the Truth of the Incarnation is
held in balance with the notion that all times are equal before the word of
God" (136), and Milton's epic about Old Testament Christians "allowed him
to moot the controversy over predestination" (139). Eve, in sinning, adds to
the word of God, and Christopher vigorously denies that she helped
IIcause" the regenerative movement in Adam in Book X. Her insistence on
"verbal" behavior suggests that Milton's prime dramatization of Eve's inferiority lies in the immense IItalk" Adam engages in, both with himself and
with angels-though when the narrator sympathetically passes silently over
Eve's first speech of reconciliation in Book X, I have always thought he
showed how nasty the fallen Adam still is at that point. Throughout, Christopher strikingly insists on the reformed view that "faith" is superior to
"love."
Because hers is a study of hermeneutics, let me turn (too quickly) from
Christopher's readings to a central and delightful paradox at the heart of
this reformed treatise: it simultaneously proposes, quite truculently at times,
! a "reading" of Milton and admits the possibility of multiple readings. Christopher beats up critics, myself included, yet she also carefully and repeatedly builds in the possibility for "any epiphany" which may occur to a
I reader (93). This follows from the reformed view that Christian experience
ll
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with the word of God is various. The Father's speeches are "bald authoritative or didactic statement," and the "emptiness or illogic" of them opens the
possibility of these various "epiphanies." Faith centrally involves the understanding that "the Word" is always potentially metonymic and metaphoric, and to the faithful, "discovery of figuration became a sign of the
Holy Spirit's presence." "It was Calvin's genius to track the motions of the
Spirit along the precise but 'viewless' paths of metonymy and metaphor, because words themselves bear no outward mark of alteration when they aTe
discovered to be figurative" (127). Christopher's approach is similarly "precise" yet "viewless."
That is, the paradox at the heart of this book is an intentional miming of
reformation hermeneutic. The "paths of metonymy and metaphor" being
invisible and their operation a mystery, Christopher can record her "epiphanies" and yet argue that others are possible. The reader works out in fear
and trembling his own "salvation" for himself. The more, the merrier. And
this approach leads Christopher quite naturally to the astonishing statement
that "anyone reading Paradise Lost will fall into Satan's pattern of response,
unless he deliberately takes a position that resists the workings of ordinary
language with its mundane field of reference" (94). When Milton calls God
"King/' he yokes "violently negative and positive associations," while the
faithful reader will subtract "the dark passions attendant upon political
monarchy" and will read "the title 'King' as a telling a fortiori statement of
divine power." Of course, Christopher would probably agree that it is impossible systematically to read in this way; "system" is a rational stance applicable only to the "sphere of nature." Connotations and contexts tinge our
response to words, resist them how we may. Indeed, the process of "making
sense of the speaker" -our immediate response to an utterance, David
Bleich has reminded us-wilts, for if the "speaker" in question is not relying on "the workings of ordinary language," then he is risking incomprehensibility. Milton, Christopher repeatedly suggests, was dramatizing
something "precise"; he also "permits" us to find our own metaphors and
metonymies. These sparkle with his "viewless" meaning, though it is pointless to worry about that meaning since we must rather exercise our faith.
I am not a man of faith, and I think it is possible to see some of what
Christopher does in Paradise Lost through the "workings of ordinary language." For instance, I think the Father's statements of doctrine in Book III
seem bald, when we encounter them, precisely because they lack the reiteration and dramatization and illumination and amplification which the episodes which follow provide. But Christopher's analysis of the Reformers'
reading of classical epic, and its place in Milton's vision, is just one of many
fine insights which derive from her approach directly. Another is the way
in which, like Milton's God, she "permits all," for Christopher's mimetic
study of hermeneutics rightly embraces the multiplicity of the ways we
interpret.
Christopher'S study, many fine details of which I am here passing over,
leads to the reflection that the printing press helped break down various
communities. The most obvious is that between speaker and hearer. Luther
had a central epiphany while contemplating the word "righteousness"
alone, just as Adam, in book x, recalls lithe Word," in Christopher's view, in
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isolation. Of course, there was no community, for reformers, between "ordinary language" and "the Word," or between "nature" and "grace." Further,
the Reformers developed a reading of epic very much at odds with that of
the humanists. Finally, Samson develops through homeopathic exposure to
his "negative identity" rather than through exchange of views. We seem, in
these days of deconstruction, to focus on a dire view of human language and
community. In a similar vein, Christopher finally and briefly suggests that
"the course of Milton's canon is itself confessional because it increasingly
acknowledges the extent to which the evil voice is enmeshed with self."
Milton, she suggests, added "the monumental sense of failure and guilt" to
Samson from his own experience. In Samson, "Milton seems to be composing
himself for death" in part by "purging" a "mixed self." "Not until moments
before the hero's departure for the Philistine theater is the Satanic voice of
rage and despair stilled-completely stilled for the first time in Milton's
poetry." It is quite a powerful conception of a life which subordinated love
to faith and intent to community.
Virginia Commonwealth University

Boyd Berry

Henry Vaughan: The Unfolding Vision by Jonathan F. S. Post. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982. Pp. xxii + 244. $22.50.

In a fine, close reading of Henry Vaughan's poems, Jonathan Post has
found continuities, has reconsidered Vaughan's "conversiqn," has explicated Vaughan's relationship to Herbert, and has shown a good deal of hidden virtue to Vaughan's work throughout. Post likes the somewhat
unloveable Vaughan, or rather likes the voice in the poems, and to begin
with, this is a book we should all keep handy for those moments when we
are preparing to teach Vaughan. Post can show us many fine things about
these poems.
Post's approach is, I suppose, old fashioned, almost militantly non-deconstructed, and new critical. For example, Post treats Vaughan's "conversion"
as a purely literary affair. That makes good sense, since the evidence we
have is purely literary as well. Aside from the record we have of his many
litigations and a few letters, we have very little. Secondly, Post writes about
"Vaughan" -which is a good deal simpler and more attractive than writing
about "the narrator" or some "text." But from the outset Post makes it clear
that it is the literary voice of Vaughan he hears about which he writes. The
vision which unfolds is a verbal and literary vision.
Post suggests that Vaughan contained his passions through literary activity. One form this took was in a search for "masters"-of the Cavalier mode
at first, then Herbert, and ultimately God (Post pinpoints the last acutely).
At the same time, Vaughan's Juvenalian impulse testifies to certain feelings
of superiority; the "phlegm" of contentiousness had to be spit out, the clamors of the world, themselves also Vaughan's clamors, subdued. Vaughan
was, to put it crudely, submissive and bossy. Post, by listening to the
"voices" in his poems, illumines the mixture while making individual
"voices" and poems more intelligible through differentiation.
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The Poems (1646) show the work of a young and self-conscious poet of the
"precieuse" and translator of Juvenal who IIcloses his first volume by questioning the very stability" of court poetry (24). His "disenchanted muse" is
more visible in Olor Iscanus, whose contrasting moods and modes figure the
continual violation of innocence-both in people and in the art of poetry itself. Indeed, poems in Olor serve to undercut the cavalier notion of friendship and to show the collapse of secular poetry. There Vaughan hopes at
moments for a transmigration of wit from poets in the past, but is ultimately
stuck or stranded in his turbulent present. What followed was not quite a
transmigration of Herbert's wit, though the first pay-off-which Post brings
out with fine precision-was a formal tightening and shaping more reminiscent of Herbert than I had realized. Vaughan was confirmed into the
church militant-into militant anti-Puritanism and into a vision of himself
as the '''lively Figure' of·a converted poet." Post shows that Silex Part II surpasses Part I, while one of the most impressive analyses is of the contrasting
sounds of peace and violence in his poems. liThe Word" was, for Protestants,
to be heard, but it seemed increasingly difficult "against a larger backdrop
of chaos and noise" in which Vaughan, particularly in his satiric moods,
himself at times participated. "When Vaughan exhorts himself to 'Spit out
their phlegm,''' he remodelled "Herbert's command for England to 'Spit out
thy flegme'" to show his recognition of his "all-too-human impulse to
indulge too fervently in the language of overkill" (184-5). "The Night"
catches again Vaughan's sense of living in a late and dusky age of poetry.
Thalia Rediviva is a subdued acknowledgement that the crisis has past, the
world has not been destroyed, and life must trudge on.
Throughout, Post shows Vaughan's continuing sense of being a poet-a
poet who joins the court, who sees the devastation of the wars about him,
who finds a solution to the dimness of the future of poetry through a conversion to dramatize religion, who out-lived the wars and the religious
lyriC. In doing so, he suggests a preoccupation with paternal authority (to
risk redundance) which may be obscured by the aggressive "language of
overkill."
There are limits to this new critical venture, needless to say, two of which
struck this reader. Post adopts Vaughan's anti-Puritanism, carelessly lumping together "Puritan reformers and mechanic preachers" (135) or the "Puritans and the lunatic fringe" (136). The Welsh Saints were a wild lot and
Vaughan no doubt had difficulty, which a critic might avoid, sorting among
his enemies; Post slips a bit farther, as when he speaks of "the difference between violence and peace, the imposter and the true saint" (133), when
there was violence and imposture on all sides. Again, it might well be
argued that Vaughan did not, actually, win the "victory" and fully "spit out
the phlegm" which Post's ordering of chapters and poems suggests. Indeed,
Vaughan may well have died an angry old man. Other readers may find
other problems deriving from the method. However, Post seems acute to
suggest that, in writing Silex (and compensating for his political situation),
Vaughan may have encountered himself among his enemies. If we knew the
dates of individual poems in Silex, we could be more certain about the victory, but the battle or holy war being fought there Post has ably shown. Finally, it is a pleasure, in this dim age, to read in excellent prose, a
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sympathetic account of a poet whom the critic appears to like.
Virginia Commonwealth University

Boyd Berry

Dickens and the Short Story by Deborah A. Thomas. Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1982. Pp. xii + 196. $18.00.

Surprising though it may seem, this is the first full-length study of
Dickens' short stories, and it is characterized by the same thoroughness as
Thomas' previous research on this subject. Two appendices-one identifying the contributors to the special Christmas numbers of Household Words
and All The Year Round, and another providing a chronology of the short
stories-increase the value of this significant study.
Thomas deals only with the stories which she, like Dickens himself, distinguishes from the sketches. Her main general points are that Dickens' stories aspire to the character of oral narration and that the fundamental
emphasis is upon the liberating power of fancy. Dickens' early fascination
with the uncanny tale proceeds from his belief that these tales offer a departure from everyday experience. Master Humphrey's Clock was a miscalculated
expression of this impulse toward escape, whereas A Christmas Carol was its
triumph. The various Christmas stories manifest the theme of escape
through fancy in many ways. The Cricket on the Hearth consciously fosters a
childish milieu, whereas The Haunted Man plays with the theme of reading
and storybooks in a sophisticated manner.
Thomas' examination of the special Christmas numbers of the magazines
he edited is particularly interesting. Restating Dickens' conviction that short
stories are especially appropriate for fanciful release, Thomas demonstrates
his conviction that the Christmas season was especially suited to such imaginative indulgence. Her exposition of Dickens' methods of assembling contributions for the special numbers reveals as much about Dickens' character
as it does about his attitudes toward his craft. For example, Dickens could
also make fun of his own ritual; Somebody's Luggage is a spoof of the problems inherent in the production of the Christmas numbers. Thomas gives
particular attention to certain underrated stories. Thus she argues that
"George Silverman's Explanation," is a subtlEr psychological study than
most scholars assume, and that "The Boy at Mugby" is "a comic masterpiece."
Thomas has focussed attention on the coherence of Dickens' short stories
through their common acknowledgment of the power of fancy, and illuminated their origins and methods. Since a study of the stories has long been a
desideratum of Dickens studies, it is especially satisfying to find this first effort so successful.
Wayne State University

John R. Reed
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Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority,
1750-1800 by Jay Fliegelman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Pp. 328. $24.95.

Ever since it emerged in the 19505 as a scholarly discipline in its own
right, American Studies has been greeted with some suspicion by the acad~
emy. Troubled by its borrowed methodology, its claims to a narrowly exclusive subject matter (as exclusive as the problematic concept of IiAmerica"
itself), historians and literary critics alike have tended to treat this hybrid
form as a kind of upstart youth still in the process of legitimizing itself.
With· the recent growing interest in interdisciplinary research, however,
American Studies has come of age to take a leading role in breaking down
the confining boundaries that have compartmentalized traditional academic
inquiry. Jay Fliegelman's new book, Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution Against Patriarchal Authority, 1750-1800, provides an example of American Studies at its best, an impressive combination of impeccable historical
scholarship and sensitive rhetorical analysis. While the subtitle of the book
might suggest yet another fashionable excursion into psychohistory, Fliegelman's work is instead a wide-ranging intellectuaL and cultural history of
the second half of the eighteenth century which sets out to show how a major shift in the Anglo-American understanding of parent-child relations-a
new emphasis on nurture rather than innate nature, benevolent example
rather than fixed precept-in effect made possible the American Revolution
against British patriarchal authority.
Building on the work of prominent social historians (Lawrence Stone and
Philippe Aries, most notably), Fliegelman begins by discussing the gradual
transformation of the family in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
from a static hierarchical structure to a more voluntaristic and affectional set
of relations which stressed parental responsibility to children as much as
children's obedience to parental authority. Fliegelman quickly breaks new
ground in this familiar territory by steering clear of a history-of-ideas approach to focus instead on the popular transmission of the new pedagogy,
how the recently invented novel served as a kind of surrogate parent or didactic guide "preaching the new Lockean gospel" (36). A series of fascinating readings of increasingly complex "bestsellers" in America culminates
with an extended analysis of Clarissa and Robinson Crusoe, the second of
which Fliegelman reads as a Puritan quest narrative whereby the fallen
prodigal son returns as the self-reliant Christian pilgrim who must sacrifice
parental affection for the unmediated love of God. Fliegelman convincingly
demonstrates that in the particularly American editions of these works,
whether they be classic novels or simple moral tracts, responsible parental
guidance is endorsed as the central means of exposing children to worldly
knowledge as well as protecting them from its dangers.
Having established the novels of Defoe and Richardson as models of justifiable filial disobedience, Fliegelman next turns to America itself to examine
the impact of the popularized Lockean pedagogy on the rhetoric of American politics, social relations, and theology. The reconsideration of the family
allowed Americans like Tom Paine and Ben Franklin to view Britain as an
irresponsible tyrannical patriarch who was unfairly trying to extract a debt
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of gratitude which had already been invalidated by the parent country's
unnatural neglect of its offspring's desire for self-assertion. The Lockean
paradigm also paved the way for a new understanding of marriage as a voluntaristic union, as well as a new understanding of God as a benevolent,
nurturing father. Fliegelman is especially good at showing that, despite
their differences, eighteenth-century Evangelicals and Rationalists in America both shared an "optimistic faith in a divinely designed program of human growth" (190) that was part of the larger cultural faith in the power of
education.
In the third and final section of the book, Fliegelman considers the consequences of antipatriarchalism for the post-revolutionary American nation
by examining the special kind. of representative father George Washington
became in the hands of popular iconographers like Parson Weems. Fliegelman then turns to the neutrality debates that dominated America's foreign
policy in the 1790s. The lesson of the French Revolution, Fliegelman suggests, threatened to destroy the delicate balance between liberty and authority in the newly gained American paradise by unleashing the "dark side" of
the Lockean ideology, the realization (expressed in Brockden Brown's novels) that seduction, flattery, and deception, operating under the guise of disinterested benevolence, could control vulnerable hearts and minds. Just as
America lapses into paranoid isolationism by the end of the century, Fliegelman concludes, so too does the newly renaturalized nuclear family in America become an insular world in itself cut off from society at large, a walled-in
edenic garden facing the nineteenth century with a mixture of hope and
anxiety.
Such a condensation of Prodigals and Pilgrims does little justice to the
wealth of both American and European cultural evidence which Fliegelman
marshalls to bring his argument to life. In the course of his study, he analyzes with great subtlety dozens of sentimental novels, hymns, etchings, political cartoons, poems, and chapbooks, not to mention contemporary
debates on paper money, inoculation, suicide, and daylight savings. Popular
works which traditional historians and literary critics have neglected or dismissed, strange obscure works like Francois Fenelon's Telemachus (1699),
Gessner's The Death of Abel (1758), and the Panther Narrative (1787), suddenly
take on new significance in the light of the shift in family relations that the
book so lucidly and comprehensively describes. Fliegelman is particularly
adept at making startling connections between seemingly disparate details,
moving brilliantly in a single paragraph, for instance, from education to
landscape gardening to mesmerism, or showing the hidden relation between changes made in The New England Primer and the invention of the
self-propelled steamboat. These are not simply ingenious analogies on Fliegelman's part, but signs of the overaching preoccupation of the age which
Fliegelman synthesizes under the concept of Lockean education.
Fliegelman's success lies in his ability to set up and then apply a compelling general paradigm that is flexible enough to illuminate a remarkable array of cultural materials without being vapid or meaningless. Yet it is the
very strength of the book which also raises some questions. By the second
chapter, the term "Lockean ideology" has become a kind of code phrase
which reappears throughout his study with such force and frequency as to
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render the argument inevitable. Eighteenth-century religious, political, and
philosophical differences-Evangelical VS. Rationalist, Whig vs. Tory, moralist VS. empiricist-are subsumed under this pervasive adjective "Lockean,"
as Fliegelman aims to uncover the common ideological ground or "unity of
the American cause" (183) that permitted the Revolution to flourish. Although he admits in a footnote that his monolithic notion of Lockean cultural hegemony still allows for a "competing ideology" (288), he does not
take into account those regional or class differences in the colonies which
would have contributed to the production of counter values. It is only after
the French Revolution, in fact, that Fliegelman recognizes the emergence of
such differences (Federalist vs. Republican, mainly), a perspective which
creates a somewhat too neat contrast between the unified optimism of the
17705 and the divisive self-interest of the 17905.
Part of the problem, I think, stems from Fliegelman's use of the term "ideology," a notoriously troublesome word signifying the interaction between
history and belief, reality and imagination, which he treats as a self-evident
concept. Fliegelman's project is primarily descriptive rather than analytic;
because he exhibits less interest in the psychological or social motives underlying a given set of beliefs than in the various forms of expression embodying that ideology, Fliegelman chooses not to emphasize the anxieties
attending the revolutionary demystification of the notion of authority.
While he is certainly right to interpret the sentimental novel as a form of
pedagogy, he sometimes overlooks the complex rhetorical strategies by
which a Sterne or a Richardson anxiously disclose, conceal, or even subvert
their own didactic intentions. Early on Fliegelman points to the "paranoid
strain" in the Lockean model of education, its tendency to destabilize the relation "between words and the things for which the words stand"(16), but
he might have strengthened his important insight connecting the rise of the
novel with the new faith in education had he shown how these authors' reservations about their own manipulative craft get worked into the form of
the fiction itself. (Richardson's diffident posing as a mere "editor" of letters,
his uneasy abdication of authorial responsibility, immediately comes to
mind) To assume that characters are "spokesmen" for authors, and authors
"spokesmen" for philosophical points of view, as Fliegelman does on occasion despite the obvious sophistication of his analyses, runs the risk of reducing the fiction to clear ideological statement, a conclusion based on the
premise that text and context can perfectly reflect one another. About this
question of mediation, as well as all similar methodological issues, Fliegelman remains silent, aside from an introductory footnote which briefly mentions Thomas Kuhn and Michel Foucault.
But such theoretical concerns may be better left for the book's rea~ers to
ponder. Fliegelman himself identifies his work as a "case study"; it is precisely because he does not stop in medias res to worry about his methods that
he can pursue his argument with such admirable clarity and energy, blending history and literature into a persuasive whole. Quite simply, Fliegelman's book dwarfs all recent attempts to arrive at a similar synthesis of this
period in American history. The wonderfully compelling case he makes for
a major revision in our understanding of eighteenth-century American sen-
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sibility, along with the many acute readings he offers in specific support,
should make Prodigals and Pilgrims of great importance for literary critics and
historians alike.

The Johns Hopkins University

Jonathan Auerbach

Roland Barthes: Structuralism and After by Annette Lavers. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1982. Pp. 300. $25.00.
The nicest thing about this book is that you do not need an accelerate
course in epistemology (the theory which relates concepts to new intellectual paradigms) to appreciate the pluralistic aspect of Roland Barthes's writing. Although it is a sort of III'homme et l'oeuvre" book which Barthes
always opposed, Lavers' text provides a good introduction to this critic in
that it combines biography and literary, social and cultural history. Inasmuch as her apparent purpose is to show Roland Barthes at lithe confluence
of all disciplines which would rank as sciences of symbolic activities: lin~
guistics, psychoanalysis, modern historical methods, anthropology, Sartrean
ontology and Marxist studies of social formation" (p. 6), she has added a selected bibliography which bears witness to Barthes's contributions in the
field of semiotics and structuralism (although his endeavor was quintessen~
tially a poetic one) and to the writing fervor of his admirers. A useful ap~
pendix, defining, briefly, those semiological terms which remain a source of
frustration to the resistant critic who would rather forget "the formidably
complex codes of academic scholarship which has brought them to pass, re~
flects the informative content and the excellent organization of Lavers's
book.
A synthetic study of this type, however, will necessarily entail omissions
and hazards. And Lavers' book is no exception. For example, the six~page
discussion of the sophisticated theories of Durkheim, Comte, Althusser,
Foucault, Lacan, Piaget, Levi~Strauss and many others, is simply not enough
to help the reader locate Roland Barthes on the ideological grid of his contemporaries. (Even Sturrock's Structuralism and Since [Oxford University
Press, 1979] could have easily been expanded into a 500-page volume.) Thus,
if the reader is a non~specialist, he may very well succumb under an ava~
lanche of details and will inevitably fail to see just how Barthes's ideas relate
to the doctrines of those discussed, even when Lavers indicates which books
should be read in conjunction with which intellectual development. In this
respect, therefore, the book defeats its own introductory purpose, for the
earnest reader whose hope was to set foot on a new epistemological shore
will be carried away by turbulent ideological cross~currents.
To be sure, tracing the evolution of Barthes's ideas when he moved
swiftly on the intellectual landscape so that his assertions were always no
more than provisional (hence his claim to an amateurish status: "I have
never been anything but an amateur,1I Barthes said in an interview in 1975)
can be an enervating experience for those who still believe in writing a IIde~
finitive" synthesis which can capture the lIessence" of this movement. But
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Barthes's iconoclastic brilliance was one of his most intriguing attributes.
And he was at his very best when it came to test the untested and to challenge the unchallenged, whether it be in the cultural stereotypes he superbly uncovered in Mythologies or in the presupposed givens which
underpin our reading of texts as in the Pleasure of the Text. Thus Lavers' superficial discussion of Roland Barthes's experiments with form, her frequent
omissions of significant themes can perhaps explain a certain feeling of
boredom (a sort of ennui with which Barthes was thoroughly familiar) one
experiences upon reading her book.
Many readers will undoubtedly commend Lavers for having eliminated
most of the jargon which characterizes modern-day criticism. (Jargonese is
defined by reticent critics as that type of language used by alien intellectuals
whose headquarters are across campus and whose intrusion into our traditional humanistic areas is considered of breach of privacy to be sanctioned
by the highest contempt.) But her introduction to the problematics of writing would have been more inspiring had she approached her discussion of
Roland Barthes as, perhaps, Sartre had approached his study of Flaubert, i.e.
from his native wound-something which eventually turns the subject into
a writing. She could then have communicated to her readers that anguish of
form which Barthes experienced when confronted with ideological choices
and which is manifested in his multifaceted writing. Indeed, as far back as
Degree Zero, Barthes began to distinguish between two essential notions:
ecriture (writing) as opposed to literature. As Lavers implies (but, unfortunately, fails to develop), Barthes believed that every form has a value and
that writing could, therefore, promote a Sartrean type of bad faith by perpetrating a form of social power and hierarchy. This is why Barthes's writings
have always reflected an anguish (the "How to say it?") but, also, a delirium
(the "desire to write").
Indeed, in addition to his uncovering of the Doxa (that great bourgeois
myth which turns the subject into a social castrato), one of Barthes's most
significant contributions to contemporary thinking is to have revealed the
presence of a desiring subject beyond Lacan's vagaries of a subject caught on
a signifying chain and, therefore, beyond the scientific explication of psychoanalysis. In the Pleasure of the Text, Barthes had suggested that writing
should pass through the body and in A Lover's Discourse, he shows us a subject (a lover) caught in the dramatic exposition of figures of affectivity. Thus,
by playing out the drama of a materialist subject, Roland Barthes admits to
the emotive aspect of all signs beyond the doctrinal auspices of semiology
and invites us to redefine the critical enterprise along the lines of the fragile
human body.
Roland Barthes has had many detractors in the past. Back in 1964, Raymond Picard entered into a long argument with Barthes over the relative
merits of his approach to Racine's work (d. R. Picard's Nouvelle Critique au
Nouvelle Imposture?). Today still, some critics, in blithe ignorance of the turmoil which has shaken the critical scene since the days of Lansonian literary
history, continue to doubt the value of his large, mutating body of writing.
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But when, at the end of this century, all the intellectual notables will have
emerged, Roland Barthes is the one whose work is most likely to endure.
And by virtue of the retroactive completeness of his work he will find himself-as he did after the Picard/Barthes dispute-with the probability factor
standing firmly on his side.
Kansas State University

Betty R. McGraw
I I

1"

